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This article examines emergent state practice of European States concerning foreign 
nationals that are merely suspected but not charged with involvement with terrorist 
offences, including deportation to destinations where they risk torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment – usually their own country of origin, contrary to the 
foremost rules of international human rights law. The article attempts a rule of law analysis 
with a view to evaluating the difficulty posed for States by the absence still of alternative 
mechanisms for ensuring both the national security interest on the one hand, and on the 
other, the human rights interest of terrorist suspects. The article argues that sustainable 
counter-terrorist strategies will be distinguished and characterised by their insistence 
on the recognition, promotion and protection of the dignity inherent in all individuals – 
including terrorist suspects whether or not they have been charged with terrorist offences. 
This calls for the urgent development of human rights steered national security policies that 
prioritize the recognition, promotion, protection and reinforcement of the dignity inherent 
in all individuals. Such policies will have at their core, strategies for the efficient resolution 
of the question of how best to deal with the individuals that are ‘merely suspected by States 
agents’ of involvement in terrorist offences, particularly foreign nationals. The article 
examines jurisprudence arising from cases involving among others the UK, Italy, Sweden, 
Spain, the Netherlands and France and shows a worrying appetite by these pro-democracy 
States to minimize human rights protection of terrorist suspects as a means of progressing 
the fight against international terrorism. This approach contradicts the international 
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paradigm of over six decades whereby the establishment and maintenance of international 
peace and security was premised on human rights. The article advocates the development 
of human rights steered policies and strategies to deal with foreign nationals suspected of 
involvement with international terrorism.
Keywords: terrorism; human rights; torture; deportation with assurance
§1. INTROduCTION
Future generations of legal historians will scarcely believe that Member States of the 
European union that for the most part of the twentieth century had premised their 
alliances first and foremost on the recognition, promotion and protection of the dignity 
inherent in individuals as human beings, the rule of law, and democracy1 had suddenly, 
and in reaction to the growing threat of international terrorist attacks2 on civilians on 
their territories and abroad, begun individually and collectively to:
(i) Challenge the sustainability of human rights guarantees, particularly to individuals 
that are merely suspected but not charged with involvement in terrorist offences.3
(ii) Forge new alliances as a means of fighting international terrorism, with autocratic 
States reputed to use torture, inhuman and degrading treatment against their 
opponents.4
(iii) Challenge and revoke fundamental tenets of the rule of law by resort to arbitrary 
arrest and indefinite detention without charge.5
1 The preamble to the uN Charter bases the Organization on the recognition, promotion and protection 
of human rights. united Nations Charter (uNC) 26 June 1945, San Francisco, uKTS 67 (1946) Cmd. 
7015; 1 uNTS xvi.
2 Examining the political challenges provoked by recent terrorist attacks, including attacks on the London 
underground on 7 July 2005 and on New York’s Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, see Chigara, ‘To 
discount human rights and inscribe them with fakeness and unreliability, OR to uphold them and 
engrave them with integrity and reliability? – experiences in the age of international terrorism’, 25 
Nordic Journal of Human Rights 1 (2007), 1.
3 See the decision of the Grand Chamber in Kadi v Council & Commission (Common Foreign & Security 
Policy [2008] EuECJ C-402/ examining the sustainability of EC Regulations incorporating uN Security 
Council counter-terrorist measures that are inconsistent with European Convention fundamental 
rights of individuals.
4 See e.g. Italy and Tunisia’s arrangements discussed in Saadi v Italy, Application No. 37201/06, Grand 
Chamber decision of 28 February 2008.
5 See Chigara, ‘The unfinished business of human rights protection and the war on terror’, 13 Asian 
Yearbook of International Law (2007), 3. See also A & Others v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, [2004] uKHL 56.
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A number of alarming recent developments support these observations. As an intervening 
party in Saadi v. Italy6 the uK Government had urged a review of the absolute ban on 
torture and coercion under ECHR law.7 Further, the uK had also queried the universality 
of the guarantees to the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, and the right to 
individual freedom against terrorist suspects.
By Section 21 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 the uK Government 
had empowered the Home Secretary to certify the indefinite detention without charge 
of foreign nationals that were perceived to be a risk to national security. Nonetheless, 
certified persons could go free at anytime that they elected to leave the united Kingdom 
altogether.
In A & Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department8 nine certified detainees 
had challenged the lawfulness of their detention. They had contended inter alia that their 
detentions were inconsistent with the uK’s obligations under the European Convention 
on Human Rights, incorporated into uK law by the Human Rights Act 1998 and that, the 
statutory provisions under which they had been detained were demonstrably incompatible 
with the Convention. The judgment observed that: ‘The power which the Home Secretary 
seeks is a power to detain people indefinitely without charge or trial. Nothing could be 
more antithetical to the instincts and traditions of the people of the united Kingdom. A 
power of detention confined to foreigners is irrational and discriminatory. Such a power 
in any form is not compatible with our constitution.’9
In Kadi v Council & Commission (Common Foreign & Security Policy)10 the 
Governments of Spain, France, The Netherlands, the united Kingdom and the 
Commission of the European Communities had all supported the Council of the 
European union in its opposition to the appellants’ main argument that neither the 
Member States of the European Community nor the institutions of the Community were 
immune from judicial review of the European Court of Justice.11
These and related developments in the practice of European Community Member 
States stand in stark contrast to their previous reputation as mutual harbingers and arch-
protagonists in the development of the requirement of the rule of law, and of international 
human rights law until this point.
Through a systematic examination of recent cases involving among others the 
Governments of the uK, Italy, Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands and France this article 
6 Saadi v Italy, Application No. 37201/06, Grand Chamber decision of 28 February 2008. See also de 
Londras, ASIL Insights at www.asil.org/search.cfm?displayPage=351 (last accessed 15 November 
2009).
7 See also declaration of the united Kingdom of 18 december 2001, registered by the General Secretariat 
of the Council of Europe on 18 december 2001, available also at http://hei.unige.ch/~clapham/hrdoc/
docs/uKderogechr18dec2001.html (last accessed 27/02/08).
8 [2004] uKHL 56 (16 december 2004).
9 [2005] 2 W.L.R. 87 per Lord Hoffman, paras. 86 and 97.
10 [2008] EuECJ C-402/05 (03 September 2008).
11 Ibid. para. 81.
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reveals a worrying tendency of States to minimize human rights protection of terrorist 
suspects as a means of progressing the fight against international terrorism. This approach 
contradicts the international paradigm for the establishment and maintenance of 
international peace and security. The article advocates the development by governments 
of, and the persistent insistence by the judiciary, on human rights centred policies and 
strategies for dealing with foreign nationals suspected of involvement with international 
terrorism.
§2. JuRISPRudENTIAL ANALYSIS ON EMERGENT STATE 
PRACTICE ON TREATMENT OF TERRORIST SuSPECTS
A. BY V SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT 12 [2008] 
(BY)
In this appeal to the uK Special Immigrations Appeals Commission BY had challenged 
the Home Secretary’s decision to obstruct his right to free movement from Germany to 
the united Kingdom as the spouse of an EEA national under Regulations 9 and 12 of 
the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006. The Home Secretary’s 
decision had been countenanced by references to national security concerns emanating 
from BY’s membership and involvement with BK – an active terrorist organisation whose 
declared objective is described as the establishment of an independent state of Khalistan, 
by all means, including terrorism.13
Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 had proscribed BK in the united Kingdom since 
February 2001. However, BK had not been proscribed in Germany14 – the country that had 
previously granted BY asylum.15 Nonetheless, EC Regulation 2580/2001 of 27 december 
2001 had required Member States to freeze BK assets because of its terrorist activities.
The decision in BY resolves the uncertainty created for individuals by the promulgation 
of powerful EC directives16 that are said to be both Community Law-amending and 
Community Law-consolidating17 in the light of Member States’ ability to circumvent 
such obligations by doing one of two things, or both.
The first of these is the invocation of the binary opposition that distinguishes between 
civil rights obligations on the one hand, and public law rights on the other. The labelling 
of EC directive obligations as public law rights has the effect of subordinating those 
12 [2008] uKSIAC 65/07 decision of 07 November 2008.
13 Ibid. para. 16.
14 Ibid. para. 16.
15 Ibid. para. 1.
16 See e.g. directive 2004/38/EC on the right of every citizen of the union a primary and individual right 
to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. The same right should be granted 
to their family members, irrespective of nationality.
17 Ibid. para. 6.
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same obligations to prerogative measures of the sovereign.18 This makes them weaker 
than previously imagined of measures with ‘direct effect’ on the territories of Member 
States.
The Commission has qualified the freedom of movement within the EEA as a public 
law right. The Commission stated that:
Control of the boundaries of a Member State is just as much ‘part of the hard core of public 
authority prerogatives,’ identified by the Strasbourg Court in Ferrazzini v Italy, when applied 
to EEA nationals as to aliens. In the case of the latter, it is firmly established that decisions 
regarding the entry, stay and deportation of aliens do not concern the determination of civil 
rights, any more than of a criminal charge: Maaouia v France. There is a clear distinction 
between deprivation of a right of residence or abode in the territory of a Member State 
resulting from the refusal of entry and the interference with the right of an individual to live 
at a particular place within a Member State of the kind which may be imposed by a control 
order: a decision on the latter may well involve determination of a civil right, in particular if 
the result of State action is to prevent an individual from living in a property which he owns 
or which he has the right to occupy. Not so where the prohibition on residence is general 
throughout the territory of the Member State.19
Generally, EC directives are understood to be binding upon Member States.20 
According to the European Parliament, directives are binding ‘as to the result to be 
achieved, upon each Member State to whom they are addressed. However, the national 
authorities are left the choice of form and methods to achieve their objectives. directives 
may be addressed to individual, several or all Member States. In order to ensure that 
the objectives laid down in directives become applicable to individual citizens, an act 
of transposition by national legislators is required, whereby national law is adapted to 
the objectives laid down in directives. Individual citizens are given rights and bound 
by the legal act when the directive is incorporated into national law.’21 Nonetheless, 
distinguishing between public law rights-creating EC directives, on the one hand, 
and civil rights-creating EC directives, on the other, has the potential to generate 
expectations of direct applicability that Member States can subsequently sideline 
by merely tipping a directive into the former category thus making it subject to the 
sovereign’s prerogative orders. In such a case, unless the public law rights envisaged by 
the EC directive are consistent with the corresponding sovereign prerogative orders (a 
situation which makes disputes inconceivable) the promulgation of law-amending and 
or, law-consolidating EC directives can create great expectations that may not after all 
materialise.
18 Ibid. paras. 11 and 13.
19 Ibid. para. 11.
20 See especially Raito, J, The Principle of Legal Certainty in EC Law, (Kluwer 2003). 83.
21 See Sources and scope of Community Law, European Parliament Fact Sheets, European Parliament 
website available at www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/1_2_1_en.htm (last accessed 11 december 
2009).
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The second is the simple invocation by States Parties of claw-back clauses similar 
to those present in Chapter VI of EC directive 2004/38. The directive confers on every 
citizen of the union a primary and individual right to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States.22 Further, the directive designates the free movement 
of persons as a core freedom of the internal market that was intended to have no 
internal frontiers.23 Even more, ‘The right of all union citizens to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States should, if it is to be exercised under objective 
conditions of freedom and dignity, be granted also to their family members, irrespective 
of nationality….’24
However, Article 27 authorizes Member States parties to restrict freedom of movement 
and residence inter alia on the grounds of public security. In the current climate in which 
national security appears to be gaining priority over human rights as the dominant driver 
of the criminal justice system, this caveat appears to have become a licence for States to 
test the strength of the judiciary’s commitment to human rights.
Where the Home department authorizes the limitation of a person’s right to freedom 
of movement and residence on grounds of national security, the individual’s only recourse 
in law is to challenge the proportionality of the limitation imposed against their claim. 
Article 27.2 requires measures taken on grounds of public policy or public security to 
comply with the principle of proportionality, based exclusively on the personal conduct of 
the individual concerned. Previous criminal convictions do not in themselves constitute 
grounds for taking such measures. Moreover, the ‘personal conduct of the individual 
concerned must represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one 
of the fundamental interests of society. Justifications that are isolated from the particulars 
of the case or that rely on consideration of general prevention are unacceptable.’25
BY’s appeal had raised the question of the applicability of EC directive-driven 
public law rights where sovereign prerogative orders enabled different outcomes. In a 
ruling of 7 November 2008 the uK’s Special Immigrations Appeals Commission (uK 
Commission) dismissed the appeal on the grounds of the limitation permissible under 
Article 27 of EC directive 2004/38 which deals with the primary and individual right to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.
The uK Commission also found that the EC directive 2004/38 created public law 
rights that were subject to sovereign prerogative rights that take priority over public law 
rights. The case is also authority for the proposition that an individual cannot be a threat 
to national security of the State of abode or intended abode, and hope to benefit from 
EC directive public law rights. Sovereign prerogative rights will prevent this even if the 
limitation clauses in the relevant EC directive fail to achieve that.
22 Preamble, para.1.
23 Ibid. para. 2.
24 Ibid. para. 5.
25 Ibid. Article 27.2.
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Even more, the uK Commission stated that BY’s membership in an organisation 
that posed a national security threat to India was sufficient grounds for denying him the 
EC directive 2004/38 public law primary and individual right to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States. It stated that:
For the reasons set out in the Closed Judgment, we are satisfied on balance of probabilities that 
BY has been and remains an active participant in the affairs of BK. As such, he poses a genuine 
and sufficiently serious threat affecting a fundamental interest of the united Kingdom namely 
its public security. It is immaterial that BK has not committed a terrorist act within the united 
Kingdom and may never do so. It does, however, promote and commit acts of terrorism in 
India. For the reasons explained in paragraphs 33 – 41 of the Judgment of Lord Woolf in Home 
Secretary v Rehman [2003] 1 AC 153, the national (and public) security of the united Kingdom 
is also put at risk by support for and the commission of terrorist acts abroad.26
B. KADI V COUNCIL & COMMISSION 27 [2008] JOINEd CASES C-402/05 
ANd C415/05
The joined cases28 of Yassin Abdulla Kadi, a resident of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and 
the Al Barakaat Foundation, established in Sweden, had challenged the legality of EC 
Regulations for ensuring compliance with Security Council Resolutions adopted under 
Chapter VII of the uN Charter.29 The Resolutions imposed inter alia certain specific 
restrictive measures against certain persons and entities associated with usama bin Laden, 
the Al-Qaeda network, and the Taliban. On 8 March 2001 the Sanctions Committee 
had published its first consolidated list of affected entities pursuant to Security Council 
resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000).30
In particular, Mr. Kadi and Barakaat had both sought the annulment of Regulation 
No. 467/2001 that contains in Annex I a list of persons, entities and bodies affected by 
the freezing of funds imposed by the Regulation.31 Individually, Mr Kadi had sought the 
annulment also of EC Regulation No.2062/2001 that had amended for the third time the 
Sanctions Committee’s Annex I (Regulation 467/2001) list of persons, entities and bodies 
affected by the freezing of funds, adding his name and others thereon.32 Barakaat had 
individually sought annulment also of EC Regulation No.2199/2001 that had amended 
for the fourth time the Sanctions Committee’s Annex I (Regulation 467/2001) list of 
26 [2008] uKSIAC Case 65/07 decision of 07 November 2008 para.20.
27 [2008] OJ 2009 C-285/2, Eu Joined Cases C402/05P and C-415/05P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al 
Barakaat Foundation v Council and Commission. Hereinafter Kadi.
28 Ibid.
29 Outlining the significance to the proceedings of the Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999); 1333 
(2000); 1452 (2002); 1455 (2003), see Kadi. Specifically see paras. 15–45.
30 Ibid. para. 30.
31 Ibid. para. 29.
32 Ibid. para.32.
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persons, entities and bodies affected by the freezing of funds, adding its name and others 
thereon.33
Mr. Kadi had argued before the Court of First Instance that the EC Regulations 
enacted to ensure Security Council Resolutions had in so far as they related to him, 
breached his fundamental rights, including the right to be heard and the right to respect 
for property as well as the principle of proportionality and the right to effective judicial 
review. France, The Netherlands and the united Kingdom had intervened to argue inter 
alia that ‘no review of the internal lawfulness of resolutions of the Security Council may 
be carried out by the Community judicature’.34
dismissing the Application, the Court of First instance had reasoned that35 
Resolutions of the Security Council, adopted under Chapter VII of the uN Charter are 
immutable. As such they are irrevocably binding on all the Members of the Community. 
Such Resolutions obligate all Members of the Community to take all measures necessary 
to ensure their fulfilment. This may require Members of the Community to vacate any 
provision of the Community Law – whether a provision of primary law or a general 
principle of community law if it threatens the fulfilment of such a Resolution. Moreover, 
the Court of First Instance had stated that ‘ … in so far as under the EC Treaty the 
Community has assumed powers previously exercised by Member States in the area 
governed by the Charter of the uN, the provisions of that Charter have the effect of 
binding the Community’.36
Regarding the question of the requirement of the Court to review the legality 
of Community measures such as the contested Regulations that seek to give effect to 
Resolutions of the Security Council, the Court of First Instance in its capacity as custodian 
and guarantor of protected fundamental rights appears to have taken an ‘incapacity 
approach’ which it then backed up with a ‘monolithic’ conception of the relationship 
between national and international law. It stated:
While the EC is based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Members nor its institutions can 
avoid review of the question whether their acts are in conformity with the basic constitutional 
charter, the EC Treaty, which established a complete system of legal remedies and procedures 
designed to enable the Court of Justice to review the legality of acts of the institutions37 … 
the contested legislation constitutes the implementation at Community level of the obligation 
placed on Member States of the Community, as Members of the united Nations, to give effect, 
if appropriate by means of a Community act38…the Community acted under circumscribed 
powers leaving it no autonomous discretion in their exercise, so that it could, in particular, 
neither directly alter the content of the resolutions at issue nor set up any mechanism capable 
33 Ibid. para. 33.
34 Ibid. para.263.
35 Ibid. para. 76–80.
36 Ibid. para.79.
37 Ibid. para. 81.
38 Ibid. para. 83.
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of giving rise to such alteration.39 [Therefore,] the challenging of the internal lawfulness of the 
contested Regulation implied that the Court should undertake a review, direct or indirect, of 
the lawfulness of the resolutions put into effect by that regulation in the light of fundamental 
rights as protected by the Community legal order.40
The monolithic view of the relationship between national law and international law 
had prevailed over the dualist approach, shutting out arguments for judicial review – 
which is the traditional hallmark of libertarian society. The Court of First instance had 
insisted that fundamental rights of individuals could not alter the applicability within 
the Community of Security Council Regulations issued under Chapter VII of the uN 
Charter.41
The Court of First Instance’s reliance on this monolithic conception of the relationship 
between national and international law as the reason why judicial review of relevant EC 
Regulations was not an option is contradicted by the Court’s own reverence of the dualist 
view of the relationship between national and international law that shows through the 
fact that EC Regulations had had to be adopted for the specific purpose of transforming 
the relevant uN Resolutions into EC Law.
Regarding the question of whether the Community measures pursuant to the 
relevant Security Council resolution breached first, the fundamental right to respect for 
property of individuals, and secondly, the right to be heard, the Court of First Instance 
had appeared to be unreceptive to the idea of ‘human rights based’ adjudication. The 
human rights approach to adjudication seeks to recognize, promote and protect the 
dignity inherent in all individuals as human beings. Instead the Court of First Instance 
had adopted a public interest based approach to the question. The Court had reasoned 
that:
[T]he freezing of funds did not constitute an arbitrary, inappropriate or disproportionate 
interference with the right to private property of the persons concerned and could not, 
therefore, be regarded as contrary to jus cogens, having regard to the following facts: the 
measures in question pursue an objective of fundamental public interest for the international 
community, that is to say, the campaign against international terrorism, and the united Nations 
are entitled to undertake protective action against the activities of terrorist organizations.42
By approaching the question from a public interest perspective the Court of First Instance 
had enabled introduction of the psychologies surrounding the question of national 
security. This focuses attention not on the rights of the accused individual in relation to 
the power of the State unleashed against them, but on the balancing act of achieving the 
‘less terrible’ among the potential scenarios/consequences. Balancing acts of this nature 
39 Ibid. para. 84.
40 Ibid. para. 85.
41 Ibid. para. 86–88.
42 Ibid. para. 92.
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are based on the introduction of binary viewpoints in order to countenance one of them. 
These exercises can obscure the issue and result in the abandonment of the exercise of 
justice.
For instance, the Court of First instance introduced the binary of ‘freezing of 
property’ and ‘confiscation of property’ to argue that the action taken against listed 
individuals, (the freezing of their funds and their assets) was less severe than its extreme 
other, (the potential confiscation of their funds and their assets). Therefore, the applicants 
could not sustain their claim of arbitrary treatment. This strategy seeks to trivialise the 
outcome for listed individuals by suggesting that more severe measures could have been 
deployed but were not. Consequently, affected individuals should count themselves 
fortunate despite being deprived of the opportunity to defend themselves against the 
accusations implied in the relevant Community Regulations. The moral of this seems to 
be that being listed on the Sanctions Committee’s list is equivalent to being found guilty 
as charged.
Without exception EC Member States’ criminal justice systems have been established 
on the presumption of innocence. The view is that, ‘… it is far worse to convict an innocent 
man than to let a guilty man go free’.43 To accept the summary listing of individuals for 
freezing of assets and funds based on allegations that they have not had a chance to 
respond to would constitute a paradigm shift of immense proportions for the European 
Community.
under ordinary circumstances the requirement of due process ‘protects the accused 
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of all of the elements 
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged’.44 Other procedural 
safeguards that underpin the presumption of legal innocence in the criminal justice 
system include ‘the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to remain silent 
while in police custody and during trial; the duty of the State to disclose exculpatory 
evidence; the right to compulsory evidence; the right to confront adverse witnesses; and 
the right to effective assistance of counsel’.45 This is because international human rights 
‘enshrine a fundamental human right, namely the protection of the individual against 
arbitrary interference by the State with his or her right to liberty’.46 This right points 
to another fundamental right, namely, the right to be heard before any action can be 
imposed by Community institutions.
Nonetheless, the Court of First Instance had insisted that the right to be heard was 
limited where the Court was incapable of reviewing the position.47 In the Court’s view, 
its incapacity derived from the fact that:
43 In re Winship, 397 u.S. 358 (1970) at 372.
44 Ibid. at 364.
45 Laufer, ‘The Rhetoric of Innocence’, 70 Washington Law Review (1995), 335.
46 A (FC) and others (FC) (Appellants) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) [2004] 
uKHL 56 Per Lord Bingham para. 41.
47 Kadi, para. 93.
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[B]oth the substance of the measures in question and the mechanisms for re-examination fell 
wholly within the purview of the Security Council and its Sanctions Committee. As a result, 
the Community institutions had no power of investigation, no opportunity to check the 
matters taken to be facts by the Security Council and the sanctions Committee, no discretion 
with regard to those matters, and no discretion either as to whether it was appropriate to adopt 
sanctions vis-à-vis the applicants.48
Whatever, the benefits of the monist approach advocated by the Court of First instance 
regarding the question whether EC Regulations relevant to uN Security Council 
Regulations were immune from judicial review in the EC, the rubber stamping formality 
envisaged for the ECJ by that approach would result in a Court whose function in relation 
to the uN Security Council served in similar circumstances to unleash blind fury against 
individuals suspected of involvement with terrorist activity.
Further, it would assert a strong negative impact on the jurisprudence of the EC, 
resulting in inconsistency, unpredictability and irreconcilable jurisprudence on the 
protection of fundamental freedoms of individuals. The human rights project has been 
strengthened in part by the Courts’ insistence on ensuring against arbitrary treatment 
of individuals by the State. In spite of the reversal of the decision of the Court of First 
Instance by the Grand Chamber on 3 September 2008, it is sufficiently worrying that such 
a decision was reached in the first place – advocating as it does, that there are times when 
the ECJ’s function and purpose can be reduced to in effect rubber stamping decisions 
of a political body external to its autonomous legal system, despite an adverse effect on 
the fundamental rights of individuals. That approach points to wilful neglect of the duty 
incumbent upon the Court as guarantor of the rule of law within the EC.
Fortunately for human rights, the Grand Chamber49 restored adjudication to its 
former orientation when it held that the EC had a basic norm, namely, the rule of law. 
That grund norm precluded both its Member States and its institutions from denying 
review of the conformity of their acts. That basic norm had also established a complete 
system of legal remedies and procedures for the Court of Justice to review the legality of 
the conduct of its institutions.50 In doing so the Grand Chamber had rejected the Court 
of First Instance arguments of incapacity that had been premised on a monolithic view 
of the relationship between national and international law. The Grand Chamber insisted 
instead on the autonomy of the Community legal system. That autonomy is ‘ensured 
by the Court by virtue of the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 220 
EC, jurisdiction that the Court has, moreover, already held to form part of the very 
foundations of the Community’.51
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid. paras. 280–376.
50 Ibid. para. 281.
51 Ibid. para. 282.
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The key question in this case was whether measures taken to incorporate uN 
Security Council Regulations into EC law were immune from judicial review. The Grand 
Chamber was unequivocal that ‘respect for human rights is a condition of the lawfulness 
of Community acts and measures incompatible with respect for human rights are not 
acceptable in the Community’.52 This is because ‘fundamental rights form an integral 
part of the general principles of law whose observance the Court ensures’.53
If follows from this that the dualist approach to the relationship between international 
law and national law could serve as a useful tool for the protection of fundamental human 
rights that a national security obsessed Security Council, or Member State Party of the 
EC might wish to set aside on account of national security interest.
C. SAADI V. ITALY 54 28 FEBRuARY 2008
Pursuant to Article 36(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights55 (ECHR), 
under Rule 44(2) of the rules of procedure,56 the uK had intervened in Saadi in support 
of Italy’s bid to deport on suspicion of terrorist offences, Nassin Saadi, a Tunisian national 
who held a residence permit issued by the Italian authorities on 29 december 2001.57 
This case seems to indicate a shift from human rights driven criminal justice systems to 
public security centred criminal justice systems, at least in relation to terrorism.
In 2006 Italy’s Minister of the Interior had ordered the deportation of Nassin Saadi 
to Tunisia under the provisions of Legislative decree No. 144 of 27 July 2005 on ‘urgent 
Measures to combat international terrorism’.58 On 29 May 2007 the Italian embassy 
in Tunis had sent a note verbale to the Tunisian Government requesting diplomatic 
assurances that Nassin Saadi would not suffer torture, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, and would not be denied justice upon his return to Tunisia. By return of 
a note verbale the Tunisian government had on 4 July and also on 10 July 2007 assured 
the Italian authorities that Nassin Saadi’s legal protections would be respected. They 
had also reminded the Italian authorities that Tunisia ‘had voluntarily acceded to the 
relevant international treaties and conventions’.59
The uK Government had argued before the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) that requirements of national security in the post 9/11 and 7/7 eras justified a 
52 Ibid. para. 284.
53 Ibid.
54 49 EHRR 30 (2009), Judgement of 28 February 2008, hereinafter Saadi. See also de Londras, Saadi v Italy: 
European Court of Human Rights Reasserts the Absolute Prohibition on Refoulement in Terrorism 
Extradition Cases, ASIL Insights (May 13, 2008), www.asil.org/search.cfm?displayPage=351.
55 213 uNTS 221 (1955).
56 Saadi.
57 Ibid, n.53 para.56–7.
58 The decree converted into statutory law No. 155 of 31 July 2005. See generally Saadi.
59 Ibid. para. 55.
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review of the prohibition against torture and ill treatment of individuals60 so that States 
should be able to deport individuals that they perceived to be a risk to their own national 
security61 regardless of whether they risked torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment in the receiving State.62
The uK Government had advanced the following reasons for its new position on 
individual freedoms of aliens:
1) Terrorism seriously endangers the absolute right to life, which is also the necessary 
precondition for the enjoyment of all other fundamental rights.63
2) The ECHR did not guarantee the right to political asylum.64
3) Article 5(1)(f) of the Refugee Convention (1951) that governs the status of refugees 
recognises the right of States to deport aliens because it authorises the arrest of a 
person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation.65
Consequently, the deporting State’s only duty of care towards the deportee may be 
limited to securing from the receiving State the assurance that s/he will not suffer torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment upon arrival at her/his destination. 
This practice, also known as deportation with assurance (dWA practice) has emerged 
in a relatively short period of time to become European States’ key counter-terrorism 
instrument66 in spite of safeguards in both national laws and the ECHR protecting 
individuals through guarantees of due process and the presumption of innocence.67 This 
development appears to be problematic for several reasons.
It could be argued that by resorting to such action at all, States are making the claim 
that national security interests justify their conversion from rule oriented democracies 
to quasi totalitarian communities, able to disregard among other things, the principle 
of presumption of innocence until proven guilty and the due process of the law68 
– de lege ferenda. It is a State’s position in regard to this de lege ferenda that typically 
distinguishes between authoritarian and liberal democratic States. If this is correct, the 
60 See Chahal v U.K. (1996) 23 EHRR 413. Judgment of 25 October 1996 (hereinafter Chahal.).
61 declaration of the united Kingdom of 18 december 2001, registered by the General Secretariat of the 
Council of Europe on 18 december 2001, available also at http://hei.unige.ch/~clapham/hrdoc/docs/
uKderogechr18dec2001.html (last accessed 27/02/08).
62 See uN Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 13 on Equality before the courts and the 
right to a fair and public hearing by an independent court established by law. See also Gridin v Russian 
Federation, Communication No. 770/1997, decision of the 20 July 2000 (sixty-ninth session), upholding 




66 See also Jones ‘deportations with assurances: Addressing key criticisms’, 57 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly1, (2008), 183. Prohibiting this practice, see Saadi.
67 Chahal.
68 See generally Chigara, Nordic Journal of Human Rights.
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uK’s intervention in Saadi v. Italy seeking a review of the absolute ban on torture and 
coercion under ECHR law69 represents a major shift away from its historic position of 
protector and proponent in the development of international human rights law. Even 
more surprising is that a twenty-first century uK Government would argue that national 
security interests justified introduction into uK courts evidence procured through 
torture as long uK agents had themselves not been directly involved in inflicting the 
torture.70
One must ask if national security ever suffices as a defence against breach of 
principles of the rule of law on the one hand, or as a justification for entering into private 
arrangements over an individuals’ basic freedoms and rights, particularly with States 
that have a record of practicing torture and violating basic human rights, States that 
Western democracies had hitherto alienated through their foreign polices at every 
opportunity.71
Thirdly, the emergent dWA practice is worrying because of its apparent conflict with 
jus cogens norms. Both the Italian case and the uK petition in Saadi v. Italy are curious 
developments unless the prevailing standards on the regulation of torture on the one hand, 
and those on international terrorism on the other are of similar juristic weight. Standards 
with similar juristic weight adduce a competing preferential capacity to regulate the same 
sphere. They impose on the Court the requirement to carefully evaluate the priority to 
be accorded to each, and in what circumstances. Support for this view is ubiquitous. One 
is the uK’s unrelenting legislative campaign against international terrorism since 9/11.72 
The other is the uK’s use of diplomatic channels to attempt a circumvention of its own 
constitutional73 and Council of Europe74 human rights obligations.
69 See also declaration of the united Kingdom of 18 december 2001, registered by the General Secretariat 
of the Council of Europe on 18 december 2001, available at http://hei.unige.ch/~clapham/hrdoc/docs/
uKderogechr18dec2001.html.
70 A(FC) and Others (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] uKHL 71.
71 Examples include the following: uK/ Libya, MOu of 18 October 2005 signed in Tripoli, Libya by 
Her Majesty’s Ambassador to Libya, Anthony Layden and the Libyan Acting Secretary for European 
Affairs, Abdulati Ibrahim al-Obidi, available on Foreign Office Website: www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/
Front?pagename=OpenMarket/xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391638&a=KArticle&aid= 
1129040148696; 
 uK/ Lebanon MOu of 23 december 2005, signed in Beirut by Her Majesty’s Ambassador to Lebanon, 
James Watt and the Lebanese Minister of Justice Charles Rizk, available on Foreign Office Website: 
www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=10070293
91638&a=KArticle&aid=1134650095963;uK/ Jordan MOu of 10 August 2005 signed at Amaan. Full 
text available on BBC website: http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/
hi/uk/4143214.stm.
72 discussing the earlier and ensuing legislation see generally Chigara, Nordic Journal of Human Rights1.
73 Especially resort to dWAS. See above n.71.
74 By a declaration contained in a Note Verbale from the Permanent Representative of the united 
Kingdom, dated 18 december 2001, registered by the Secretariat General on 18 december 2001 the uK 
Government sought derogation from Article 5 of the ECHR on account of the public emergency within 
the meaning of Article 15 (1) of the Convention. See also at http://hei.unige.ch/~clapham/hrdoc/docs/
uKderogechr18dec2001.html. See also Article 2(1) and 1(1) of the PTA (2005) discussing the tension 
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Fourth, the emergent dWA practice has reopened the sore issue of whether jus cogens 
– intentional law’s ‘super-norms’75 are real, or a mere utopian construction that is starkly 
opposed by State practice in the pursuit of national interest. This is because, if dWA 
practice goes unchecked, it could add disregard for jus cogens to the list of inconsequential 
State breaches of international law.
The dominant view appears to be that in spite of occasional setbacks in the development 
and enforcement of norms of international law, the international community requires a 
category of universally binding norms of jus cogens that do not depend for their force on 
prior State consent, otherwise States would have no way of dealing with certain, complex 
international concerns.
§3. THE GROWING THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORISM
A. STATES dISCOVER THEIR ACHILLES HEEL – THE LEGACY OF 9/11 
ANd 7/7
Since 9/11 and 7/7 the Security Council has passed at least twenty-one resolutions on the 
matter of counter terrorism.76 Of these, resolution 1373 is arguably the most important 
because it creates new law and establishes a mechanism for its enforcement. The 
resolution obliges States to criminalise in their national jurisdictions, terrorism and all 
terrorism-facilitating activities; and to cooperate in counter terrorism activities in order 
to constrain this menace – what Kofi Annan referred to as the 5-ds approach, namely, 
dissuade, deny, deter, develop and defend.77
Resolution 1373 establishes the uN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) 
comprising the 15 Security Council delegations. The CTC is mandated to monitor States’ 
implementation of the resolution and where necessary, to provide relevant technical 
assistance to uN Member States.78
created by uK counter-terrorism legislation against its human rights obligations under the Human 
Rights Act (1988). See also Sands ‘British Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005’, ASIL Insights, available at 
www.asil.org/insights/2005/04/insights050427.html.
75 Paust, ‘The Reality of jus cogens’, 81 Connecticut Journal of International Law (1991–1992), 81.
76 At least three in 2001 – 1377, 1373 and 1368.
77 See ‘The uN against terrorism’, at uN website: www.un.org/sc/ctc/unaction.shtml. See also uN General 
Assembly resolution on The uN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, General Assembly Resolution A/
Res/60/288 (20/09/06).
78 S/Res 1373 (2001) 28 September. Available at uN website: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/uNdOC/
GEN/N01/557/43/PdF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement.
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B. RuLE OF LAW COuNTER-TERRORISM dRIVEN POLICIES ANd 
STRATEGIES
The emergent dWA practice79 allies States that have records of practicing torture and 
violating basic human rights of individuals80 with those States reputed for instigating 
development of international human rights as we know them today. This points to the 
ascendance of national security interest and the potential rapid decline of human rights 
as the convergence factor for States today.81 The practice could also be explained as early 
indications of emerging customary international law on the right of States to deport 
foreign nationals that they suspect of involvement with unproven terrorist offences.
C. THE PROBLEM WITH dWA PRACTICE AS A TOOL FOR ENSuRING 
NATIONAL SECuRITY
dWA practice appears on the face of it to be both arbitrary and divorced from the legal 
safeguards of due process. It is manifestly opposed to the foremost norms of international 
law, including the prohibition against torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment and the requirement of non-refoulement that prohibits the forcible return of 
refugees to their countries of origin.
dWA practice appears also to positively reward torturing States that are willing to 
do the ‘unacceptable dirty work’ for Western States.82 In the process, deporting States 
become both duplicitous and complicit in the perpetuation of State torture. dWA as a 
practice is incomprehensible especially for the strict regulationist who requires consistent 
reference and adherence to, and the persistent application of standards in their sphere of 
79 Agreements between States are binding under international law regardless of their designation. See 
Anglo Norwegian Fisheries Case (UK v. Norway) ICJR (1951), 116. Article 2 (b) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (1969) (VCLT) provides that a treaty ‘is an international agreement concluded 
between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single 
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation’.
80 Examples include the following: uK/ Libya, MOu of 18 October 2005 signed in Tripoli, Libya by 
Her Majesty’s Ambassador to Libya, Anthony Layden and the Libyan Acting Secretary for European 
Affairs, Abdulati Ibrahim al-Obidi, available at Foreign Office Website: www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/
Front?pagename=OpenMarket/xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391638&a=KArticle&aid= 
1129040148696; uK/ Lebanon MOu of 23 december 2005, signed in Beirut by Her Majesty’s 
Ambassador to Lebanon, James Watt and the Lebanese Minister of Justice Charles Rizk, available on 
Foreign Office Website: www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/xcelerate/ShowPage&
c=Page&cid=1007029391638&a=KArticle&aid=1134650095963; uK/ Jordan MOu of 10 August 2005 
signed at Amaan full text available on BBC website: http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/
print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4143214.stm.
81 Outlining the tenets of legitimacy, see also Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International Legal System’, 82 
American Journal of International Law (1988), 705.
82 See also A (FC) and Others (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] uKHL 71, per Lord 
Bingham.
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operation83 because in spite of its present character which is at best nascent custom, it is 
already challenging peremptory norms of international human rights law.84
Recently described by Human Rights Watch as the uK’s dangerous ambivalent policy 
towards torture,85 dWA practice contradicts States’ publicly proclaimed international 
human rights obligations. It appears to be a national security instrument borne out of 
extreme and unnecessary desperation.86
The horrific terrorist attacks on New York, London, Bali, Turkey, Nairobi, Mumbai 
and other places in recent times has brought to the fore of international debate the 
difficulty of ensuring national security at the start of the twenty-first century. In tackling 
this problem the uK Labour government appears to have supposed that judges were 
going to accept their decision to practice dWA. Further, the Government appears to have 
presumed that the uK courts were going to accept evidence obtained through torture as 
long as uK agents had themselves not been involved in its production.
It is perhaps significant that a growing band of commentators regard international 
terrorism as a significant, noteworthy and legitimate policy driver that requires a 
change in the legal traditions of Western democracies. They argue that under particular 
circumstances torture could and should be applied in abeyance of human rights’ 
guarantees to any individual suspected of planting a bomb if the torture of that individual 
by law enforcement agents previously authorised by a judge is likely to save the lives of 
innocent members of the public.
However, the prohibition against torture in Article 15 of the Convention against 
Torture (1984) charges State Parties to the Convention to ‘… ensure that any statement 
which is established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as 
evidence in any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as evidence 
that the statement was made’. This procedural requirement has become a criterion for 
distinguishing between civilised States and uncivilised States.
Professor Bozeman87 writes that all political systems have been concerned with 
security in their public orders.
The annals of history tell us that ‘security’ is an elusive goal everywhere, in great empires and 
commonwealth as well as in small folk societies, city-States and nation States. Throughout 
83 See Kelsen, ‘The Pure Theory of Law: Its Method and Fundamental Concepts, Part I’ 50 Law Quarterly 
Review (1934), 475.
84 See Kreimer, ‘Too close to the rack and the screw: Constitutional constraints on torture in the War on 
terror’, 6 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law (2003), 278.
85 See ‘uK: A dangerous Policy on Torture’, available at Human Rights Watch website: http://hrw.org/
english/docs/2006/11/02/uk14482.htm. See also: www.hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/uk1106/.
86 British Prime Minister Tony Blair called this the new ‘values and interest’ based foreign policy pursued 
by his government. See democratic Leadership Council website at: www.dlc.org/ndol_ci.cfm?contenti
d=253880&kaid=128&subid=187.
87 Bozeman, ‘Human Rights and National Security’, 9 Yale Journal of World Public Order (1982–1983), 
42.
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time, ‘security’ has been in short supply for generations of human beings, whatever their 
political habitat and status in society.
The moral appears to be that human rights should not become international terrorism’s 
whipping boy. But the current practice of portraying the national security dilemma as 
trumping human rights concerns creates a binary opposition between the two ideas that 
is often exaggerated to unfairly indict human rights as a facilitator of terrorism.
If not corrected, this logical fallacy will be used by States to create a much deeper 
crisis, precipitated by the minimization and often outright denial of human rights 
of individuals who are merely suspected of involvement with terrorist offences. The 
emergence of dWA practice shows governments’ timidity in dealing with the challenges 
posed by international terrorism.
But what is uncertain is whether the ‘any blow will do’ approach that is evident in the 
knee-jerk policy shift of Western States from recognizing and protecting human rights 
of individuals to undermining them will suffice to combat international terrorism. This 
is because the key issue regarding the central case about law is practical reasonableness.88 
Previously, Western States premised their alliances on the policy of human protection 
of others and the principle of the rule of law. The fact that international terrorism has 
changed that demonstrates the enormity of the challenge of national security in the 
age of international terrorism. But should it result in the shrinking of the gap between 
fundamental practice of democratic States and their autocratic rivals on the rule of law 
and protection of basic human rights of individuals?
The policy shift from recognition, promotion and protection of basic human rights 
of individual to denunciation of the same and renunciation of aspects of the rule of law 
has heightened debate among and between the radical idealists on the one hand, and the 
radical realists on the other. domestic, regional and international courts and tribunals 
are having to clarify the meaning and immutability of certain principles all over again, 
especially the significance of the constitutional requirements of the principle rule of law 
and human rights in the face of dWA practice that encourages and promotes indefinite 
detention without trial, and deportation of terrorist suspects to destinations where they 
risk torture, inhuman or degrading treatment.89
This development has rekindled the question of whether the reality of universal 
human rights is mere speculation in light of its subservience to brute State force whenever 
occasion calls for it.
88 Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, (Sweet and Maxwell, 7th ed. 2001).
89 See Lambert, ‘Protection against refoulement in Europe: Human Rights comes to the rescue’, 48 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 3 (1999), 515.
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d. REALIST ANd IdEALIST CRITIQuE
Radical realist critique regards human rights as merely another tool in States’ armour. 
They may be relevant or not, alongside other commitments in the consideration of the 
best possible outcome. In this regard, human rights are neither sacrosanct nor immutable. 
For this reason it is possible to characterise them as hypothetical and nothing more. They 
should always be counterbalanced by society’s prevailing circumstances and challenges.
Radical idealist critique insists that human rights inhere in the status of being 
human.90 They are more sympathetic to the immutable theory of human rights. They 
argue also that human rights have become both the deoxyribonucleic acid (dNA) of 
human dignity and index to the rule of law in democratic States. Therefore, whatever 
strategies States adopt to deal with any challenge ought always to comply with their 
international human rights obligations. If this is correct, then considerations of national 
security that seek to undermine the dignity inherent in individuals qua human beings 
are misguided and inconsistent with the rule of law upon which democratic States are 
premised. Consequently, they are not logically sustainable.
The idealist perspective reduces dWA to a measure which increases security at 
the price of human development, particularly in western democracies where this is 
measured by State pursuit and adherence to international human rights obligations and 
the rule of law. In his treatise on ‘The Judgement of the Nations’ dawson warns that: ‘As 
soon as men decide that all means are permitted to fight evil, then their good becomes 
indistinguishable from the evil they set out to destroy’.91
E. dRAWING LINES IN THE SANd: AT WHAT POINT dOES AN 
INdIVIduAL BECOME A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECuRITY?
The united Kingdom (uK) Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) has stated 
that determination of the relationships and factors that constitute national security 
interest is a matter for the executive and not the Courts.92 In this sense, it is a political 
rather than a legal matter. For the uK government, a foreign national is, or becomes, a 
risk to national security and deserving of dWA practice if he or she is a member of an 
organisation that is willing to actively support violent Islamist opposition abroad against 
a regime that is averse to international terrorism.93
90 See generally Chigara, ‘Nordic Journal of Human Rights.
91 See Murphy, ‘Man’s Inhumanity to Man: The Case of Political Terrorism’, The Flannery O’Connor 
House Lecture Series, 2002, available at: www.cjsocpols.armstrong.edu/murphy/flannery_lecture.htm.
92 See DD and AS v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department, Appeal No: SC/42 and 50/2005, 
judgment of 27 April 2007, para. 29, available at Justice department website: www.hmcourts-service.
gov.uk/legalprof/judgments/siac/siac.htm.
93 Ibid. para. 34.
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The reciprocal and mutual benefit that States that engage in dWA obtain is the 
suppression or possible eradication of agents, purveyors and supporters of international 
terrorism. The moral is that a political enemy of a State that is opposed to international 
terrorism is a natural threat to uK national security from the moment that (i) the uK 
labels him/her a terrorist suspect or, (ii) if the State of origin claims that he is wanted 
back for questioning/charges of seeking to overthrow that government in furtherance of 
international terrorism. This follows from emerging State alliances against international 
terrorism.
According to SIAC, the uK government’s prerogative in this matter enables it to lay 
down the test of deportability. Thereafter, it is for the courts to weigh the facts in each case 
in order to ascertain whether that threshold had been met in accordance with established 
requirements of fairness in a democratic society and submission of the executive to the 
rule of law. In this sense, the policy of the uK to embrace and make new friends on 
account solely of their newly discovered potential to confer reciprocal advantage in the 
war against international terrorism underlines two things. One is the current shortage 
of much needed tools to counter international terrorism. The other is the desperation on 
the part of governments to immediately restore relative parity with non-State actors that 
now threaten national security in more complicated ways than States themselves do. In 
the circumstances, the question is whether dWA practice is sustainable.
The problem of course is that the success or failure of ‘desperate measures’ is often 
down to chance rather than calculated deliberate and purposive meticulous planning. 
This raises the further question of whether national security as a legal defence for State 
minimization of human rights of individuals is not a two edged cutting sword that serves 
to ensure the human rights of the public on the one hand, and the utmost compromise of 
the human rights of foreign nationals suspected of terrorist conduct on the other.
F. CLEARING THE MISCONCEPTIONS
Recent Home Secretary John Reid threatened to take the uK out of the ECHR regime 
unless the decision in the Chahal94 case was rescinded. In that case the European Court 
of Human Rights had considered inter alia the question whether the threat that a foreign 
national might pose to national security entitled the host State to extradite the former 
even if that would expose the former to a real risk of being subjected to ill treatment 
contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights – itself a peremptory 
norm of general international law. The Court had replied in the negative. It stated that 
the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture, inhuman, degrading treatment or 
punishment, ‘… irrespective of the victim’s conduct’.
94 Chahal.
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The idea is simple. Where individuals fail, the State should not and must not fail in 
similar fashion by not recognizing and protecting the inherent dignity of the human 
being. Having a bad father does not entitle oneself to become a bad son or daughter.
Thus, whenever substantial grounds have been shown for believing that an individual would 
face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 if removed to another 
State, the responsibility of the contracting State to safeguard him or her is engaged in the event 
of expulsion. In these circumstances, the activities of the individual in question, however 
undesirable or even dangerous, cannot be a material consideration.95
The absolute quality of the prohibition against torture, inhuman or degrading treatment 
of individuals under international law precludes the sacrificing of individuals’ inherent 
dignity qua human beings on the altar of national security. It requires instead that States 
adopt measures and strategies that always put the recognition, promotion and protection 
of human rights of individuals first. The free world has recognised, endorsed and sought 
fervently to uphold this view for a long time. The threat of international terrorism appears 
to be a test for modern States’ commitment to this principle. Their responses stand to 
either devalue or enhance the international human rights project.
G. dWA PuRPOSE
The legitimacy of dWA practice is linked inter alia to its ability to secure its purpose 
without uprooting the pillars on which civilized society has been established. Therefore, 
an evaluation of the dWA’s practical purpose in the light of the legal challenges that 
it faces is called for, especially because of the evolving international constitutional 
arrangements in international relations.
Especially for the deporting State, dWA practice is first and foremost an embarrassing 
acknowledgment that the receiving State has a poor human rights record, hence the 
need for the ‘assurance agreement.’ dWA assurances enable the receiving State to make 
additional assurances that this time around, it will honour its international human rights 
obligations with regard to this particular deportee. The deportee is therefore placed in 
a special category of his own and enjoys greater human rights protection than the rest 
of the citizens because he or she is an enemy of the State. This makes dWA practice an 
attempt on the part of the deporting State to cleanse its own conscience by throwing its 
arms up in the air and rolling its eyes to the sky in a ‘what else can we do?’ attitude.
It appears also to be an attempt by the deporting State to persuade the public that 
the deportee is not being sacrificed on the altar of national security. The fact is that these 
deportees are being sent to a State that is reputed for torturing and breaching human 
95 Ibid. Confirmed by the House of Lords in A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2005] 2 W.L.R. 87 at para. 9.
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rights of individuals on its territory than respecting it96 and that has no record of being 
merciful to its enemies.
Moreover, the deporting and receiving states share the view that the deportee is at best 
undesirable. Why would the receiving State wish to have such a person in its territory? 
The most probable reason is that the receiving government is only too grateful to land 
its hands on its erstwhile enemy. This makes it more likely than not that the deportee 
will be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, contrary to the deporting 
State’s international obligations not to send any individual to a destination where they 
risk torture.
It has been suggested that the receiving State is more likely than not to observe and 
honour its MOu undertakings because the deportee’s case has already been widely 
publicised. Consequent, both private and public local and international organisations 
will be observing the deportee’s case in order to ensure that the receiving State honours 
its assurances. Reliance on the activism of organisations that the receiving State also 
has a record of ignoring provides weak safeguards. Public shaming is often the only tool 
such organizations have. Receiving governments are in this situation because of their 
immunity to shame. Therefore this argument is unsustainable simply because its record 
is one of failure in most cases.
Another argument often made to justify the deportations in spite of the obvious 
and real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment for the deportee is that the 
agreed system of periodic policing of the MOu undertakings between the deporting 
and receiving States will stop the receiving State from mistreating the deportee. doubt 
about this stems from the fact that States regard the MOu strategy as a mechanism for 
strengthening cooperation in the fight against a common threat in order to ensure their 
own safety and survival.97 It appears more than ambitious to expect that the cooperating 
States will engage in any type of conflict over the receiving State’s treatment of their 
common worst enemy.
Moreover, the deporting State may well need to deport other terrorist suspects to 
the same State in the future. That makes criticizing the receiving State a non-starter. 
At the very least, it would create problems for the deporting government which could 
not realistically return additional foreign nationals to the offending state in the face of 
domestic criticism. Thus it is most unlikely that the deporting State will query the ill 
treatment of deportees, even if it had reason to do so. It also makes any assurances of 
the receiving State that the deportee will be well treated untrustworthy and any claims 
96 See, Omar Othman (aka Qatada) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Appeal No:SC/15/2005, 
Judgment of 26 February 2007, para. 169, available at Justice department website: www.hmcourts-
service.gov.uk/legalprof/judgments/siac/siac.htm.
97 See DD and AS v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department, Appeal No: SC/42 and 50/2005, 
judgment of 27 April 2007; See also Omar Othman (aka Qatada) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ibid.
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of the deporting State that it will supervise the receiving State’s compliance with their 
agreement a practical nonsense.
H. INTERNATIONAL LAW’S REQuIREMENT NOT TO SENd AN 
INdIVIduAL TO A PLACE THAT THEY RISK TORTuRE, INHuMAN 
ANd dEGRAdING TREATMENT ANd THE MOu STRATEGY FOR 
dEALING WITH FOREIGN NATIONALS SuSPECTEd OF TERRORIST 
ACTIVITY
dWA practice is contrary to international law’s requirement on States to act in good faith 
towards their international commitments in that:
(i) It results in private deals between States regarding the welfare of individuals that 
themselves are regarded by the transacting States as mere consideration,98 – i.e. a 
benefit that passes from the deporting State to the receiving State.
(ii) It seeks to undo or amend States’ publicly and universally established guarantees 
not to send individuals to destinations where they will face a real risk of torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.
(iii) It enables the deporting State to avoid due process regarding its claims of terrorist 
offences against the deportee whom they can punish by returning him to a state 
where he or she is considered an enemy of the state. By treating the deportee as 
consideration in a private deal, the deporting State loses immediately any moral 
authority to challenge the receiving State about its treatment of the deportee. This in 
itself incites the receiving State to treat the deportee any way it chooses.
Pinochet No.399 has made it unequivocally clear that it is not the function of the State to 
undermine the dignity inherent in individuals qua human beings. Consequently, State 
officials could not plead the defence of State immunity when accused of breaching the 
basic human rights of individuals.
I. ON WHAT BASIS WOuLd dWA PRACTICE ATTAIN 
SuSTAINABILITY?
To be sustainable, national ordering strategies of democratic States must be consistent 
with established constitutional requirements100 and correspond with international 
98 See generally E. McKendrick, Contract Law (Macmillan, 4th ed, 2007).
99 Regina v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3), 
[1999] H.L. 2 Weekly Law Reports, 827.
100 In 1911, uS Supreme Court Justice Horace Lurton wrote in the National Review: ‘The contention 
that…the Constitution is to be disregarded if it stands in the way of that which is deemed of the public 
advantage…is destructive of the whole theory upon which our American Commonwealths have 
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human rights law. unsustainable social ordering processes collapse because of their 
failure to engage constructively criticisms levelled against them. Present day Zimbabwe 
is teetering on the verge of economic collapse, political stalemate and social malaise 
because of the anti-human rights arbitrariness of its current government.
Sustainable strategies are characterised by their consistency in regard to: constitutional 
arrangements, international human rights morality and practice, the requirements of 
norms jus cogens and measurable tenets of efficiency. At first glance dWA practice does 
not appear to be consistent with these criteria. The House of Lords was unequivocal that 
Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was irrational, discriminatory 
and contrary to the rule of law in that it deprived the detained person of the procedural 
protection upon which the criminal justice system had been moulded.101 Consequently, 
dWA practice has been judged to fail on all of the four criteria of sustainability referred 
to above.
This jurisprudential chaos occasioned by the emergent dWA practice is significant 
to that extent that it fits the mould of nascent custom. Rather than undermine the 
legitimacy of the international legal system, this jurisprudential chaos has the potential 
to strengthen the international legal system by fine-tuning the scope and limits of 
previously established standards as well as possibly creating new norms on the right of 
States to dWA practice.
§4. CONCLudING REMARKS
The latest intelligence coefficient test for international lawyers is probably this: how should 
States respond to the growing threat of international terrorism. This article examined the 
sustainability of emergent State practice of European States concerning foreign nationals 
that are merely suspected but not charged with involvement with terrorist offences, 
including deportation to destinations where they risk torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment – usually their own country of origin, contrary to the foremost 
rules of international human rights law (dWA practice).
Although dWA practice could be characterised as nascent custom, perhaps with 
potential instantly to create jus cogens on the right of States to arbitrarily sidestep the 
judicial guarantees of due process enshrined in the rule of law and human rights in order 
to combat international terrorism, it nevertheless breaches the basic theory that norms 
jus cogens are higher norms that no State should ever challenge.
The emergent dWA practice inclines States more towards a rule of suspicion and autocracy 
rather than the rule of law and human rights. This compromises individuals’ human 
been founded.’ Lurton, available at Quotes from Supreme Court Justices website: http://home.att.
net/~midnightflyer/supreme.html.
101 A & Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 W.L.R. 87.
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rights, especially those of foreign nationals by exposing them to the risk of deportation 
to destinations where they risk torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, contrary to 
international human rights law. The deportation of foreign nationals perceived to be a 
threat to national security once an agreement has been reached with the receiving State 
– usually the subject’s country of origin, and a memorandum of understanding (MOu) 
signed with an indication that the suspect will not suffer torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, also known as dWA practice, is inconsistent with the rule of law.
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR ruled in Saadi v Italy that the prohibition against 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, is absolute, irrespective of the 
victim’s conduct.102 It makes no provision for exceptions or derogation under Article 15, 
even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation.103 Therefore, 
under Article 3, dWA practice is, by reason of creating a situation whose outcome results 
in the exposure of the deportee to the risk of proscribed ill treatment, unacceptable.104
The decision in Saadi v Italy privileges the overriding quality of jus cogens over other 
sources of international law, including treaties, even to the extent of nullifying MOus for 
the deportation of terrorist suspects to destinations where they risk torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment. However, the potential for States to persist with dWA practice and 
to attempt a partial or complete circumnavigation of the emergent jurisprudence, which 
insists on a human rights centred counter-terrorism strategy, persists. States continue 
to act primarily in self-interest.105 As long as governments of receiving States perceive 
a significant advantage in receiving their enemies and governments of deporting States 
perceive significant benefit in the dWA practice, the Saadi v Italy decision is unlikely to 
be the final straw on this matter.
102 Saadi, para.127.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid, para. 126.
105 See also L. Henkin, How Nations Behave, 2nd ed., (Columbia university Press, 1979).
